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The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the main factors driving
economic growth in the OECD countries. A few countries – including the United
States, the technology leader – have experienced an acceleration in growth of
GDP per capita, but other major economies have lagged behind, raising questions
as to the role of technological progress as well as policy and institutions. This
paper aims at shedding some light on these issues by presenting evidence on the
long-term links between policy settings, institutions and economic growth in
OECD countries while controlling for underlying differences in technological
progress. In particular, the focus is two-fold: first, on the possible influences of
human capital, research and development activity, macroeconomic and structural
policy settings, trade policy and financial market conditions on economic effi-
ciency; second, on the effects of many of the same factors on the accumulation of
physical capital.
While empirical studies support the relevance of these factors for economic
growth, this literature often relies on a large set of countries, including many non-
OECD economies and, once constrained to the OECD sample, results are often
unsatisfactory (Temple, 1999). The cross-country variability in both growth pat-
terns and potential explanatory variables is much smaller if one focuses on the
OECD sub-sample. Hence, data quality and the estimation approach assume an
even more crucial role in the empirical analysis. We tackle both issues by using
harmonised OECD data and a novel econometric approach that reconciles growth
model assumptions with available data.
As in a number of recent studies, we use pooled cross-country time-series
data in order to explain both cross-country differences in growth performance as
well as the evolution of performance over time in each country. In addition, our
econometric technique allows short-term adjustments and convergence speeds to
vary across countries while imposing (and testing) restrictions only on long-run
coefficients (i.e. those related to the production function). To anticipate the main
results of this study, we find the accumulation of physical as well as human capital
to be the main drivers of economic growth. In addition, R&D activity, a sound mac-
roeconomic environment, trade openness and well-developed financial markets
contribute to raise living standard in OECD countries. Some of the same factorsThe Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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that operate “directly” on growth also influence it indirectly via the mobilisation of
resources for fixed investment.
The paper is organised as follows. In the first section, we briefly introduce the
policies and institutional dimensions that are considered in the empirical investi-
gation of the sources of economic growth. The section focuses on the transmission
mechanisms linking policy to growth as well as on cross-country differences in
policy settings and their evolution over time. The institutional and policy vari-
ables considered have three basic characteristics: i) they are largely macroeco-
nomic in nature; ii) they yield testable implications for economic growth; and
iii) they can be evaluated using available data across countries and over time. In
the second section we introduce the estimated growth equation and discuss the
econometric approach used in the regressions. The third section presents the
econometric results. The estimated coefficients from the growth regressions are
also used in the fourth section to assess the role of different policy settings in
the evolution of growth both over time and across the OECD countries. The final
section concludes.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
The literature on economic growth is vast and policy-oriented studies, in par-
ticular, have flourished in the past decade (see Temple, 1999 and Ahn and
Hemmings, 2000 for surveys). Yet, there is little agreement on the exact mecha-
nisms linking policy settings to growth. For example, if one assumes, consistent
with the traditional neo-classical growth model, diminishing returns to reproduc-
ible factors and exogenous saving rates, population growth and technological
progress, then policies have no role in shaping long-term economic growth. Under
these circumstances, richer countries grow at a slower rate than poorer countries
adjusted for demographic differences. However, evidence of this process of uncon-
ditional convergence has weakened, at least amongst the OECD countries, in the
most recent decades (Figure 1).1 Thus, the concept of convergence can only be rec-
onciled with the data if one moves to conditional convergence; that is to say, a relation
between growth rate and initial conditions after controlling for other variables.
Relaxing the hypothesis of exogenous saving and capital formation gives
room for policy to affect growth in the short and medium-term via an impact on
saving and the level and composition of investment. Indeed, a number of studies
suggest that policy and institutions affect the level of economic efficiency with
which resources are allocated in the economy. Nevertheless, whether through its
effect on investment or on the level of economic efficiency, a one-time change in
policy leads only to a transitory change in output growth in such models. When
the capital stock and output have risen to levels at which the new rate of grossOECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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investment is only sufficient to maintain a constant capital/labour ratio plus an
amount to cover physical depreciation, growth reverts back to the steady state
rate. In other words, any policy change will affect output growth only in the short to
medium-term by shifting the growth path, although the underlying rate of growth
remains determined by exogenous population growth and technical progress (that
are potentially different across countries).
Another class of growth models relaxes the assumption of diminishing returns
to reproducible factors. Some authors add human to physical capital to derive a
concept of “broad” capital characterised by constant or even increasing returns to
scale (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991). Others introduce externalities to the accu-
mulation of physical capital whereby private returns to scale may be diminishing,
but social returns can be constant or increasing – due to either learning by doing
(e.g. Romer, 1986; Young, 1991) or R&D (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman,
1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). With constant (or increasing) returns to (“broad”)
capital, the long-term rate of growth becomes endogenous, in the sense that it
depends on investment decisions which, in turn, could be influenced by policy
and institutions. Some of these endogenous growth models imply “conditional”
convergence, while others do not, depending on assumptions about the specifica-
tion of the production function and the evolution of broad capital accumulation
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Durlauf and Quah, 1999 for reviews).
Only empirical observation can provide evidence on which view of the link
between policy and growth is most relevant, but results of such studies are often
ambiguous. Aggregate analyses, such as the one we present in this paper, can only
shed some light, while microeconomic evidence is needed to better assess the
links between capital accumulation and technological progress. Bearing this in
mind, we look at the influence of policy and institutions on GDP per capita by esti-
mating a growth equation and an investment equation. The GDP per capita growth
equation aims at identifying the effect on output of a policy variable over and
above its potential impact on investment, while the investment equation is
intended to identify the possible impact of the policy variable on the level of
investment. The remainder of this section presents the different variables consid-
ered in our analysis.
Basic determinants of growth: the accumulation of physical and human capital
The accumulation of physical capital
The rate of accumulation of physical capital is one of the main factors deter-
mining the level of real output per capita although, as stressed above, its effects
could be more or less permanent depending on the extent to which technologicalOECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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innovation is embodied in new capital. Whatever the transition mechanism from
capital accumulation to growth, the significant differences in the investment rate
across countries and over time point to it as a possible source of cross-country dif-
ferences in output per capita. In particular, long-run averages of business-sector
investment rates range from around 10 per cent to over 20 per cent of GDP. Fur-
thermore, major shifts in investment rates within countries are not uncommon, a
notable example being the rapid rise in the US investment rate in recent years.
In the empirical analysis, we consider the accumulation of physical capital by
private agents (proxied by the share of business investment in GDP). Public-sector
investment is also considered in extended growth equations to assess its indepen-
dent impact on output, as suggested by Aschauer (1989), as well as its potential
effect on the estimated coefficient of the business-sector investment rate.
Human capital
Recent studies on growth also assume that formal skills and experience
embodied in the labour force represent a form of (human) capital. On the one
hand, it could be argued that human capital is subject to some kind of diminishing
returns so that a more highly trained and skilled workforce would enjoy higher lev-
els of income in the long term, but not necessarily permanently higher growth
rates of income. On the other hand, investment in human capital (e.g. expendi-
tures on education and training) could have a more permanent impact on the
growth process if high skills and training go hand-in-hand with more intensive
research and development and a faster rate of technological progress, or if the
adoption of new technologies is facilitated by a highly skilled workforce.2 As in the
case of physical capital, only empirical evidence can shed some light on social
returns to investment in human capital and, thus, help in discriminating amongst
competing theories.
In this study, human capital is measured by estimates of the average number
of years of formal education among the working-age population, based on figures
on educational attainment and assumptions about how many years of education a
particular level of attainment represents. These indicators are admittedly only
crude and somewhat narrow proxies, taking little account of quality aspects of for-
mal education or other important dimensions of human capital. Nonetheless, esti-
mates of the average years of schooling amongst the working-age population
suggest that, despite some convergence over time, there remain significant differ-
ences between countries as to the level of educational attainment. In 1970, the
average length of formal education of the working age population ranged from
5.7 years (Spain) to 11.6 years (United States), whilst the most recent observations
still indicate a range from 7.7 to 13.6 years (Portugal and Germany, respectively)
(Figure 2). The figure also indicates that increases in average length of educationThe Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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range from less than half a year on average per decade (e.g. the United States) to
more than one year on average per decade (e.g. Germany and Italy, the latter from
a relatively low level).
Research and development
Expenditure on research and development (R&D) can be considered as an
investment in knowledge that translates into new technologies as well as more
efficient ways of using existing resources of physical and human capital. Indeed, in
the case of R&D, there seems to be stronger consensus that it may have a persis-
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tent effect on growth, that is, higher R&D expenditure would, ceteris paribus, be
associated with permanently higher growth rates.
The amount of resources that are devoted to R&D can be influenced by gov-
ernment intervention. In particular, the potential benefits from new ideas may not
be fully appropriated by the innovators themselves due to spillover effects, which
imply that without policy intervention the private sector would likely engage in
less R&D than what could be socially optimal. This can justify some government
involvement in R&D, both through direct provision and funding, but also through
indirect measures such as tax incentives and protection of intellectual property
rights to encourage private-sector R&D (see Nadiri, 1993 and Cameron, 1998, for
reviews).
Overall expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP has risen since the 1980s in
most countries (Figure 3), mainly reflecting increases in R&D activity in the busi-
ness sector that accounts for the majority of expenditure in this area in most OECD
countries. Indeed, the share of publicly financed R&D has declined over the past
decade in most countries as a result of reductions in military R&D budgets.
Several issues have to be considered in assessing the role of R&D on growth.
First, the relationship between public and private R&D could be one of comple-
mentarity or substitution. Second, public-sector R&D is often directed at making
improvements in areas not directly related to growth, such as defence and medi-
cal research, and any impact on output growth could be diffused and slow to come
about (see OECD, 1998). These considerations suggest that any quantitative anal-
ysis of growth must take R&D activity into account as an additional form of invest-
ment and differentiate between various types of R&D expenditures. Given data
availability, we consider total R&D expenditure (as a share of GDP) and its compo-
nents, public and business sector R&D expenditure.
Macroeconomic policy setting and growth
In the context of growth studies, three issues have generally been considered
with respect to macroeconomic policy settings: the benefits of establishing and
maintaining low inflation, the impact of government deficits on private invest-
ment, and the possibility of negative impacts on growth stemming from a too-large
government sector (with associated high tax pressure to finance high government
expenditure).
Inflation and growth
The usual arguments for lower and more stable inflation rates include
reduced uncertainty in the economy and enhanced efficiency of the price mecha-
nism. A reduction in the level of inflation could have an overall effect on the level
of capital accumulation in cases of tax distortions (e.g. nominally-denominatedThe Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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Figure 3. Expenditure on R&D in the OECD countries
1980s and 1990s
Total expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP
Business-enterprise expenditure on R&D Non-business-enterprise expenditure on R&D
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allowances) or when investment decisions are made with a long-run perspective
(e.g. shift in technologies). Moreover, uncertainty related to higher volatility in
inflation could discourage firms from investing in projects that have high returns,
but also a higher inherent degree of risk.3
Evidence on the relationship between inflation and growth is somewhat
mixed: while there is evidence that investment suffers in cases of high inflation,
the relation is less clear in cases of moderate or low inflation (see e.g. Edey, 1994;
Bruno and Easterly, 1998). Moreover, to the extent uncertainty is the link to invest-
ment and growth, it would suggest a focus on variation in inflation. However, given
the correlation between level and variability of inflation, the two effects could be
difficult to distinguish.
Based on the above discussion, two indicators of inflation are considered in
the empirical analysis: the level of inflation and its variability. These indicators are
included in the growth equation, which incorporates the investment share,
whereby the estimated impact on growth occurs via the effects of these variables
on overall efficiency and the choice of investment projects. They are also included
in the investment equation, which permits testing for an effect of both variables
on the level of investment.
Fiscal policy and growth
Fiscal policy settings can affect output and growth in the medium term as well
as over the business cycle. In particular, where government deficits finance con-
sumption or transfers, a traditional argument for prudent policy is to reduce the
crowding out effects on private sector investment. Also, if fiscal policy is seen as
being at odds with monetary policy, the credibility of the latter could be under-
mined leading to risk premia in interest rates and pressures on exchange rates,
with repercussions on capital accumulation.
It has been argued that taxes necessary to finance government spending
could also distort incentives, with negative implications for the efficient allocation
of resources and hence the level or the growth of output. The main conclusion
from the literature is that there may be both a “size” effect of government inter-
vention as well as specific effects stemming from the financing and composition of
public expenditure. At a low level, the productive effects of public spending are
likely to exceed the social costs of raising funds. However, government expendi-
ture and the required taxes may reach levels where the negative effects on effi-
ciency and hence growth starts dominating. These negative effects may be more
evident where the financing relies heavily on more “distortionary” taxes (e.g. direct
taxes) and where public expenditure focuses on “unproductive” activities.
Between the 1980s and 1990s the “size” of the public sector tended to
increase in most OECD countries as did government gross liabilities. MoreThe Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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recently, public-sector balances have improved significantly. Notwithstanding
these important developments, the share of total government expenditure in GDP
was still in the range of 40-50 per cent in a number of OECD countries in 1999
(Table 1). Moreover, less than 20 per cent of public expenditure in OECD countries
consists of expenditure that could be classified as directly “productive”
(e.g. schooling, infrastructure and R&D). And in a number of countries, the share of
“productive” expenditure declined over the past decade.
In our empirical analysis of both growth and investment, supply-side hypoth-
eses relating government size to growth are tested by looking at both taxation and
Table 1. Total government outlays and "productive" government spending as a share 
of total spending in OECD countries, 1985, 1995 and 1999
 Percentage















R&D A + B + C Share of total government 
outlays in GDP
1985 1995 1985 1995 1985 19954 1985 1995 1985 1995 1999
Australia 14.6 13.2 10.1 8.3 2.15 2.24 26.8 23.6 37.3 35.5 32.3
Austria 9.6 9.5 3.3 2.1 1.2 1.4 14.1 13.0 50.1 52.6 50.7
Belgium 12.7 .. 8.7 .. 0.9 .. 22.3 .. 57.3 50.1 47.9
Canada 13.0 .. 5.4 .. 1.5 .. 19.8 .. 46.0 46.3 40.2
Denmark 11.3 11.7 4.0 3.0 1.2 1.2 16.4 15.9 56.63 59.0 54.3
France1 10.5 10.7 2.9 1.9 2.3 1.8 15.7 14.4 51.8 53.5 52.2
Germany 9.5 7.6 4.3 3.4 2.2 1.8 16.0 12.9 45.6 46.3 45.6
Iceland 13.0 12.3 9.0 7.6 1.6 2.5 23.6 22.4 32.57 36.0 33.4
Ireland1 10.6 12.2 4.5 5.0 0.8 0.8 15.9 18.0 46.6 36.4 31.5
Italy 10.0 8.9 7.7 4.6 1.2 1.0 18.8 14.5 50.6 52.3 48.3
Japan 12.8 10.84 .. .. 1.8 1.9 .. .. 31.6 35.6 38.1
Korea 17.8 18.1 7.1 9.6 .. 2.7 .. 30.4 17.6 19.1 25.5
Netherlands 9.9 .. .. .. 1.8 .. .. .. 51.9 47.7 43.2
New Zealand .. 13.34 .. .. .. 1.31 .. .. 52.66 38.8 40.8
Norway 12.03 13.7 6.63 5.9 1.6 1.6 20.2 21.3 41.5 47.6 46.1
Portugal2 8.7 13.3 3.6 4.8 0.55 0.9 12.9 19.0 40.2 44.5 44.7
Spain 8.8 10.3 6.3 6.0 0.7 0.9 15.8 17.1 37.7 42.5 38.6
Sweden .. .. .. .. 1.7 1.7 .. .. 60.3 62.4 55.9
S w i t z e r l a n d 1 9 . 7. . 1 1 . 4. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
United Kingdom 10.2 12.1 3.2 3.6 2.0 1.5 15.5 17.2 43.07 44.4 39.9
Unites States .. .. .. .. 4.1 2.8 .. .. 33.8 32.9 30.1OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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government spending. The potential role of the structure of financing and expen-
diture is considered by looking separately at direct and indirect taxes and differ-
ent components of government expenditure. In this context, the human capital
variable discussed above may be taken to represent past and present govern-
ments’ efforts in financing education.4 Likewise, public spending on research and
development are clearly identified in the extended models that include R&D
(see below). Finally, public investment has been included as distinct from con-
sumption to test if that distinction is pertinent.
Financial development and growth
Financial systems also contribute to economic growth by providing funding
for capital accumulation and by helping the diffusion of new technologies. A well-
developed financial system is likely to mobilise savings by channelling small sav-
ings of individuals into profitable large-scale investments, while offering savers a
high degree of liquidity. It also provides insurance to individual savers against
idiosyncratic risk through diversification, and it reduces the costs of acquiring and
evaluating information on prospective projects, for example through specialised
financial advisory services. All these services are likely to contribute to economic
growth, but there could, in theory, also be opposite effects. For example, lower
risk and higher returns resulting from diversification may prompt households to
save less, if income effects dominate substitution effects. Furthermore, to some
extent growth may prompt the development of financial systems, thus there may
be an element of reverse causality.
Ideally, we would like to use qualitative indicators of the possibilities offered
to firms to access external funds and the ease with which investors can get ade-
quate returns. However, available information is only limited to quantity indica-
tors (Leahy et al., 2001). In particular, we consider the total claims of deposit
money banks on the private sector, which measures the degree of financial inter-
mediation via the banking system. Moreover, we look at stock market capitalisa-
tion (the value of listed shares), which is an imperfect indicator of the ease with
which funds can be raised in the equity market.
International trade and growth
Aside from the benefits of exploiting comparative advantages, theories have
suggested additional gains from trade arising through economies of scale, expo-
sure to competition and the diffusion of knowledge. These could result both in
higher overall efficiency and possibly a higher level of investment (e.g. if the adop-
tion of foreign technologies requires investment in new types of capital). The
progress OECD countries have made in reducing tariff barriers and dismantling
non-tariff barriers would therefore suggest positive gains from trade.5 However,The Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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trade may also be endogenous to the process of growth. The relatively open
stance towards trade in OECD countries would suggest that the amount of trade
conducted reflects patterns of growth (and to some extent geography, size and
transport costs) as much as it reflects constraints in the form of tariff and non-tariff
barriers.6
The possible reverse causality problem in the relationship between trade
and economic growth suggests some caution in interpreting empirical results. In
particular, we treat the intensity of trade in the growth equation as an indicator of
trade exposure – capturing features such as competitive pressures – rather than
one with direct policy implications. Apart from bearing this caveat in mind, the
empirical analysis also has to take into account that small countries are naturally
more exposed to foreign trade, regardless of their trade policy or competitive-
ness, while competitive pressure in large countries to a large extent stems from
domestic competitors. To better reflect overall competitive pressures, the indica-
tor of trade exposure was adjusted for country size by regressing the crude trade
exposure variable on population size and taking the estimated residuals from this
exercise as the (adjusted) trade variable in the analysis.
SPECIFICATION OF THE GROWTH EQUATION AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
The estimated growth equations
Formally, the policy-augmented growth equation can be derived from a
growth model built around a constant-returns-to-scale technology (see
Appendix 1 for the derivation of the model). Output is a function of capital,
employment, the efficiency with which they act together, and the level of technol-
ogy. Given straightforward assumptions on how the factors of production evolve
over time, the steady-state level of output per capita can be expressed as a func-
tion of the propensity to accumulate physical capital, the population growth rate,
the level and growth rates of technological and economic efficiency, and the rate
of depreciation of capital. Moreover, if the concept of capital is widened to include
human capital, then the propensity to accumulate the latter is also a factor shap-
ing the steady-state path of output per capita.
If countries were at their steady state – or if deviations from the steady state
were random – growth equations could be simply based on the relationship link-
ing steady-state output to its determinants. However, actual data may well include
out-of-steady-state dynamics due, among other things, to a slow convergence to
the steady state (see, amongst others, Mankiw et al., 1992, for a discussion). Hence,
the observed growth in output in any given period, abstracting from cyclical fluctu-
ations, can be seen as the combination of three different forces: i) underlying tech-OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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nological progress – which is assumed to be exogenous; ii) a convergence process
towards the country-specific steady-state path of output per capita; and iii) shifts
in the steady state (growth or level of GDP per capita, see below) that can arise
from changes in policy and institutions as well as investment rates and changes in
population growth rates.
The empirical approach adopted in this paper starts with a parsimonious
specification of the growth equation and then analyses extended models. The ini-
tial specification is consistent with the standard neo-classical growth model and
includes only a convergence factor and the basic determinants of the steady state,
namely the accumulation of physical capital and population growth. The first
extension involves the introduction of human capital while further extensions con-
sider R&D and a set of policy and institutional factors potentially affecting eco-
nomic efficiency.
The OECD sample permits the use of annual data instead of averages over
time, as often done in the cross-country empirical literature.7 However, year-to-
year variations in output include cyclical components. These have been con-
trolled for by including first differences of the steady-state determinants as short-
run regressors in the estimated equations. Considering pooled cross-country time
series (i denotes countries, t time) the growth equation, in its more general form,
can be written as follows: 
where y is GDP per capita, sk is the propensity to accumulate physical capital; h is
human capital; n is population growth; the Vj is a vector of variables affecting eco-
nomic efficiency; t is a time trend; the b-regressors capture short-term dynamics
and ε  is the usual error term.
It should be stressed that equation [1] is a fairly general specification, and
different growth models are nested in it. This is important for the interpretation of
the policy variables which could be taken to represent either growth effects or
level effects (see above). The estimated parameters of equation [1] allow to dis-
tinguish amongst some of these models. In particular, a significant coefficient on
the lagged level of GDP per capita, i.e. the existence of convergence towards a
country-specific steady state, would exclude one class of endogenous growth
models (i.e. those à la Romer, 1986).8 However, this would not be sufficient evi-
dence to rule out other endogenous models (e.g. à la Lucas, 1988).9 Indeed, even
in the presence of convergence, a number of empirical papers have interpreted
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The distinction between temporary or permanent growth effect may seem
somewhat semantic if the speed of convergence to the steady state is very slow,
as it is the case in most empirical studies focussing on a large set of countries.11
However, consistent with some recent studies focussing on panel data, we find a
relatively rapid speed of convergence for the OECD countries and thus, the choice
between the two alternative interpretations of the results does matter in drawing
policy conclusions. We take a prudent view and interpret the estimated coeffi-
cients as indication of temporary effects on growth due to the shift effect on the
steady-state path of output per capita.
The econometric technique
The main advantage of pooled cross-country time-series data for the analysis
of growth equations is that the country-specific effects can be controlled for, e.g. by
using a dynamic fixed-effect estimator (DFE). However, this estimator generally
imposes homogeneity of all slope coefficients, allowing only the intercepts to vary
across countries. The validity of this approach depends critically on the assump-
tion of a common growth rate of technology and a common convergence parame-
ter (see Lee et al., 1997). The first assumption is difficult to reconcile with evidence
on multifactor productivity patterns across countries (see e.g. Scarpetta  et al.,
2000). The second assumption is not consistent with the underlying growth model,
where the speed of convergence depends, amongst other factors, upon the rate of
population growth (see Appendix 1).12 An alternative approach is to use the mean-
group approach (MG) that consists of estimating separate regressions for each
country and calculating averages of the country-specific coefficients (e.g. Evans,
1997; Lee et al., 1997). While consistent, this estimator is likely to be inefficient in
small country samples, where any country outlier could severely influence the
averages of the country coefficients (see below).
An intermediate choice between imposing homogeneity on all slope coeffi-
cients (DFE) and imposing no restrictions (MG) is the pooled mean group estima-
tor (PMG) that allows intercepts, the convergence parameter ( ),13 short-run
coefficients (bs) and error variances to differ freely across countries, but imposes
homogeneity on long-run coefficients. There are good reasons to believe in com-
mon long-run coefficients for the OECD countries, given that they have access to
common technologies, and have intensive intra-trade and foreign direct
investment, all factors contributing to similar long-run production function
parameters. Under the assumption of long-run slope homogeneity, the PMG
estimator increases the efficiency of the estimates with respect to mean group
estimators (Pesaran et al., 1999). Formally, conditional on the existence of con-
vergence to a steady state path, the long-run homogeneity hypothesis permits
φOECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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the direct identification of the parameters that affect the steady state path of
output per capita (as,i/ i =  s, see below). In other words, with the PMG procedure,
the following restricted version of equation [1] is estimated on pooled cross-coun-
try time-series data: 
Similarly, the investment equation has the general form: 
i.e. the share of business sector investment in GDP is assumed to depend on the
level of GDP per capita, human capital and a set of policy and institutional factors.
In both equations, the hypothesis of homogeneity of the long-run policy
parameters cannot be assumed ap r i o r i  and is tested empirically in all specifica-
tions.14 Moreover, given the limited degrees of freedom in the country-specific
policy-augmented growth regressions, the time trend was not included. Indeed, a
sensitivity analysis suggested that a time trend was only statistically significant
when human capital is omitted.15 In addition, a sensitivity analysis suggests the
presence in our database of a handful of observations that significantly increase
the standard error of the regression and/or affect the estimated coefficients. Thus,
these observations have been removed from the sample.16
REGRESSION RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
The growth equations were estimated for 21 OECD countries over the
period 1971-1998.17 The countries were chosen because they have continuous
annual series for most of the variables used in the growth equations over the bulk
of the 1971-98 period. Details on the variables used in the regression are in Box 1.
This section presents the core results of the econometric analysis, while a detailed
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Box 1. Description of the variables used in the empirical analysis
The baseline equation includes the following explanatory variables
(see Appendix 2 for more details):
• Dependent variable (∆ lnY). Growth in real GDP per head of population aged
15-64 years expressed in (1993) Purchasing Power Parities (PPP).
• Convergence variable (lnY-1). Lagged real GDP per head of population aged 15-
64 years, in PPP.
• Physical capital accumulation (lnSk). The propensity to accumulate physical
capital is proxied by the ratio of real private non-residential fixed capital
formation to real private GDP.
• Stock of human capital (lnH) is proxied by the average number of years of
schooling of the population from 25 to 64 years of age.
• Population growth (∆ lnP). Growth in population aged 15-64 years.
The auxiliary policy-related variables included in the augmented growth
regressions were as follows:
• Measures of inflation: i) the rate of growth of the private final consumption
deflator (Infl); and ii) the standard deviation of the rate of growth in private
final consumption deflator (SDInfl) – estimated as a centred three-year
moving-average.
• Indicators of government size and financing: i) the share of general government
current nominal tax and non-tax receipts in nominal GDP (lnTax); ii) the ratio
of direct to indirect tax receipts (ln(Tax distr); iii) the ratio of government
nominal final consumption expenditure to nominal GDP (ln(Gov cons)); and
iv) the ratio of government real fixed capital formation to real GDP (lnSkgov).
• Measures of R&D intensity: i) gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percent-
age of GDP (lnR&Dtot)); ii) business sector expenditure on R&D as a percent-
age of GDP (lnBERD); and iii) the difference between gross domestic
expenditure on R&D and business sector expenditure on R&D as a percent-
age of GDP (lnR&Dpub).
• Indicators measuring financial development: i) private credit of deposit money banks
provided to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (ln(Priv Credit)); and
ii) stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (ln(Stock Cap)).
• Indicators of the exposure of countries to foreign trade: a weighted average of export
intensity and import penetration. It is calculated as follows: Trade Exp = Xi +
( 1–X i ) * M p , where Xi is the ratio of exports to GDP and Mp is the ratio of
imports to apparent consumption (domestic production minus exports plus
imports). In the empirical analysis this measure was adjusted for country
size as described above (ln(Trade exp)adj).
All the auxiliary policy-related variables, with the exception of those related
to R&D, have been introduced with a lag to better identify their impact on output.OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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The role of convergence and capital accumulation in the growth process
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients and implied parameters for physi-
cal and human capital and convergence from different specifications of the growth
equation. In all specifications the convergence parameter is significant, suggesting
a (conditional) process of convergence and supporting the specification adopted
in equation [2]. In the human capital augmented equations, the speed with which
countries converge to their specific steady state path of output per capita is, how-
ever, higher than what is generally found in growth regressions focussing on larger
sets of countries. Estimates reported in Table 2 suggest that, following a change in
a steady-state variable, it takes about 4-5 years to go half way to the new steady
state output per capita. With rapid convergence, a policy change will have only a
temporary impact on growth, but its potential effect on living standards will be
quickly felt. Hence, observed changes in factor inputs as well as in policies over
past decades are likely to have significantly affected growth patterns and are of
importance in the assessment of cross-country differences.
In all specifications where they are included, the coefficients on both physical
and human capital appear with the expected sign and are highly significant.
There is, however, some variability in the estimated coefficients that implicitly
underlines the importance of model specification. The three right-hand-side
specifications in Table 2 indicate an implied value for the capital share of about
20 per cent, which is broadly consistent with National Accounts data. The esti-
mated share of human capital is, however, quite large (60 per cent in the pre-
ferred specifications).18 This implies that one extra year of average education
(corresponding to a rise in human capital by about 10 per cent) would lead to an
average increase in steady-state output per capita by about 4-7 per cent.19
These values contrast with (many) growth studies that have found no or very lim-
ited effects of human capital on growth (see, for example, Benhabib and Spiegel,
1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), although the lowest of the present estimates
are broadly consistent with estimated returns to schooling in the microeconomic
literature (see Psacharopoulos, 1994).20
Taken at face value, the results on human capital might imply significant posi-
tive spillovers and a gap between private and social returns to education, or that
the human capital indicator is acting as a proxy for other variables (over and above
those included as framework conditions), an issue also raised in some microeco-
nomic studies. The first interpretation of the results potentially has important pol-
icy implications. Insofar as policy affects the accumulation of human capital (most
prominently through education policy), and the spill-over effects are sufficiently
large to imply overall non-declining returns over some range, its effect on growth
may not be limited to a shift in the steady-state output level but possibly lead to
more persistent (although not necessarily irreversible) effects.The Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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The estimated coefficients on broad capital (physical and human) and the
speed of convergence, taken together, are not consistent with the standard neo-
classical growth model. In particular, a high output elasticity to broad capital
should be associated with a very low speed of convergence to the steady state or
vice versa.21 The fact that the output elasticity to broad capital is close to unity sug-
gests that the OECD data are more consistent with an endogenous growth model
that allows for conditional convergence. In particular, as discussed in Bassanini
and Scarpetta (2002), an endogenous growth model à la Uzawa-Lucas with constant
returns to scale to “broad” (human and physical) capital can be observationally
equivalent to a more standard neo-classical model with diminishing returns to
broad capital.
The role of macroeconomic policy and institutions on growth
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results relating to the role of variables
reflecting macro policy, trade exposure and financial development. Where appro-
priate, a version of the regression allowing the long-run coefficient of the addi-
Table 2. The role of convergence and capital accumulation for growth: 
summary of regression results
 (Pooled Mean Group Estimates)
All equations include a constant country-specific term and control for outliers. The variables are defined in Box 1. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
* : significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.
1. The standard equation includes investment share in physical capital, population growth and lagged output per capita.
2. The equation also includes trade exposure, inflation and standard deviation of inflation.
3. The equation also includes trade exposure, standard deviation of inflation and tax and non-tax receipts.
4. The equation also includes trade exposure, standard deviation of inflation and government consumption.
5. Implied parameters of the production function .
6. Time to cover half way to convergence as implied by the estimated average coefficient of lnY-–1.






LnSk 0.39 *** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24***
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
LnH … 1.00*** 0.41*** 0.70*** 0.71***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13)
LnY-1 –0.05*** –0.12*** –0.17*** –0.15*** –0.15***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Partial output elasticities:5
Physical capital 0.28 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.20
Human capital … 0.85 0.33 0.57 0.57
Half way to convergence6 13.9 years 5.3 years 3.9 years 4.3 years 4.3 yearsOECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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tional variable of interest to vary across countries is reported alongside results
where the homogeneity of long-run coefficients is imposed. It should be recalled
that all the augmented regressions include investment (in physical capital) as an
explanatory variable. Hence, the results can be interpreted as showing the effect
on output over and above that which may be operating indirectly via investment.
Since our results suggest a significant (positive) impact of trade exposure on GDP
per capita, whenever possible the equations include this variable in the specifica-
tion of the growth equation.
Table 3. Macro policy influences on growth1
(Pooled Mean Group Estimators)
1. All equations include short-run dynamics and country-specific terms. Moreover, they control for outliers. The vari-
ables are defined in Box 1. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
*: significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.
2. The Hausman test rejected the hypothesis of common long-run coefficient and thus the coefficient was estimated
without cross-country restrictions.




With control for taxes
and government 
expenditures
With control for both inflation 
and fiscal policy
Long-Run Coefficients
LnSk 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.14*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
LnH 0.41*** 1.26*** 0.92*** 0.88*** 0.70*** 0.71***
(0.13) (0.22) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.13)
∆ lnP –5.69*** –3.862 –15.70*** –11.01*** –9.76*** –7.87***
(1.02) (3.82) (3.96) (1.57) (1.31) (1.21)
SDinfl–1 –0.02*** –0.02*** –0.03*** –0.03***




–1 0.07*** 0.09*** –0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Gov cons)–1 0.19*** –0.15** 0.04 –0.10**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)




Ln(Trade expadj)–1 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.10* 0.14** 0.20*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Convergence coefficient
LnY–1 –0.17*** –0.17*** –0.21*** –0.13*** –0.15*** –0.15***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No. of countries 21 17 21 17 18 21
No. of observations 523 427 522 427 444 523
Log likelihood 1 553 1 362 1 541 1 595 1 349 1 556The Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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Overall, the results suggest a significant impact of macro policy settings on
output per capita across countries and over time. The regression results suggest
that the variability of inflation has an important influence on output per capita: its
estimated coefficient is always negative and more than two standard errors from
zero (Table 3). This result supports the hypothesis that high variability of inflation
adds noise to capital and other markets, with the repercussion likely including an
inefficient choice of potential investment projects, with lower average returns of
the set of projects actually undertaken. The effect of the level of inflation is less
clear-cut:22 in the trade-augmented specifications presented in Table 3, the level
of inflation seems to have a negative and significant impact on the steady state
level of GDP per capita, but this is not always so when the trade variable is
excluded.23
The hypothesis that the size of government has an impact on growth receives
some qualified support (Table 3). The overall measure of tax and non-tax revenue
can be used only for a sub-sample of 18 OECD countries, due to data availability.
Table 4. Regressions including indicators of financial development1
(Pooled Mean Group Estimators)
1. All equations include short-run dynamics and country-specific terms, and control for outliers. Variables are defined
in Box 1. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
*: significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.
Dependent variable: ∆ lnY with private credit ... and control for inflation with stock market 
capitalisation
Long-Run Coefficients
LnSk 0.07 0.30*** 0.14***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
LnH 1.04*** 0.99*** 0.93***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
∆ lnP –14.48*** –11.54*** –4.80***
(2.34) (1.77) (0.89)







LnY–1 –0.10*** –0.13*** –0.22***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
No. of countries 21 21 18
No. of observations 523 523 338
Log likelihood 1449 1498 1058OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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The sample is further reduced to 17 countries when a distinction between direct
and indirect taxes is introduced. The overall tax burden is found to have a nega-
tive impact on output per capita.24 Furthermore, controlling for the overall tax bur-
den, there is an additional negative effect coming from an extensive reliance of
direct taxes. With control for the overall size and distribution of the tax burden,
both government consumption and investment seem to have a positive impact on
output per capita. The second specification on fiscal policy considers only the
expenditure side of the government budget, and allows extending the sample to
21 countries. In this case, the coefficient on government consumption becomes
negative (and statistically significant). This suggests that focusing on one side of
the budget and ignoring the other leads to systematic biases associated with the
“implicit financing” assumption.25 In particular, given the high within-country corre-
lation between the tax variable and government consumption,26 the coefficient on
consumption when the tax variable is not included should be taken to indicate the
effect on growth of the “size” of government, rather than the true effect on growth
of one specific element of total expenditure.
The equations in the last three columns of Table 3 include both the variability of
inflation and the different fiscal policy variables. The key result is the stability of the
coefficient for the variability of inflation across all specifications and the continued
negative, if somewhat uneven, impact of government size, whether proxied by total
tax burden or by government consumption in the last column of the table. By contrast,
government investment becomes insignificant as soon as the model is extended and
is dropped in the final specifications on the right-hand side of the table.
Some indication of the link between financial development and growth is pre-
sented in regressions including indicators of private credit from the banking sector
and stock market capitalisation (see also Leahy et al., 2001). Table 4 gives general
support to the notion that the level of financial development influences growth,
even after controlling for the propensity to invest. This perhaps points to a greater
capacity of more developed financial systems to channel resources towards
projects with higher returns. The results point to a robust link between stock mar-
ket capitalisation and growth, while that between private credit provided to the
private sector and growth has the wrong sign, when there is no control for inflation
variability. This may reflect the fact that the banking credit indicator is related to
other monetary variables, including money supply and demand conditions.
Indeed, an extended model that also includes inflation variability points to a posi-
tive relationship between private credit and growth.
Research and development
The analysis of the determinants of growth can be further extended to include
R&D activities, even though the sample is smaller and inference therefore moreThe Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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tentative. In particular the analysis is restricted to 14-17 countries depending on
the specification, and to the period 1981-98 (and for some countries the period is
shorter). The shorter time-series significantly restrict the number of variables that
could be considered in the regressions. These include, in addition to the R&D
variables, the basic controls and trade exposure, whenever possible.27 The indica-
tors of R&D activity used here are expenditures on R&D as collected in national
accounts expressed as a percentage of GDP and are thus indicators of the “inten-
sity” of R&D within each country. The results (Table 5) support previous evidence
suggesting a significant effect of R&D activity on the growth process.28 Further-
more, regressions including separate variables for business-performed R&D and
the R&D performed by other institutions (mainly public research institutes) sug-
gest that it is the former that drives the positive association between total R&D
Table 5. Regressions including R&D intensity1
(Pooled Mean Group Estimators)
1. All equations include short-run dynamics and country-specific terms. Variables are defined in Box 1. Moreover, they
control for outliers. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
*: significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.
2. The Hausman test rejected the hypothesis of common long-run coefficient and thus the coefficient was estimated
without cross-country restrictions.
Dependent variable: ∆ lnY With total 
R&D






LnSk 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.34***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
LnH 1.13*** 1.76*** 0.82***
(0.16) (0.05) (0.18)








Ln(Trade expadj)–1 0.33*** 0.32***
(0.05) (0.05)
Convergence coefficient
LnY–1 –0.22*** –0.23** –0.18***
(0.05) (0.11) (0.04)
No. of countries 16 15 16
No. of observations 252 236 251
Log likelihood 860 831 849OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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intensity and output growth.29 The results also indicate that the coefficient on
business-sector R&D is somewhat lower in the regression with the indicator of
trade exposure. This suggests possible interactions between R&D and interna-
tional trade: the estimated impact of R&D on growth may be overestimated if no
proper account is taken of the degree of market openness of a country. Neverthe-
less, the R&D coefficients remain largely significant in this augmented regression.
The negative results for public R&D needs some qualification. Taken at face
value they suggest publicly performed R&D crowds out resources that could be
alternatively used by the private sector, including private R&D. There is some evi-
dence of this effect in studies that have looked in details at the role of different
forms of R&D and the interaction between them.30 In particular, it is found that
defence research performed by the public sector does indeed crowd out private
R&D, partly by raising the cost of research. However, there are avenues for more
complex effects that regression analysis cannot identify. For example, while busi-
ness-performed R&D is likely to be more directly targeted towards innovation and
implementation of new innovative processes in production (leading to improve-
ment in productivity), other forms of R&D (e.g. energy, health and university
research) may not raise technology levels significantly in the short run, but they
may generate basic knowledge with possible “technology spillovers”. The latter
are difficult to identify, not least because of the long lags involved and the possi-
ble interactions with human capital and associated institutions.31
Bearing these caveats in mind, the coefficient on business-performed R&D
intensity, if interpreted structurally, suggests that a persistent 0.1 percentage
point increase in R&D intensity (about 10 per cent increase with respect to aver-
age R&D intensity) would have a long-run effect of about 1.2 per cent higher out-
put per capita under the “conservative” view that changes in R&D do not
permanently affect output growth. However, in the case of R&D it is perhaps more
appropriate to consider a permanent effect on GDP per capita growth (i.e. a fall in
R&D intensity is not likely to reduce the steady-state level of GDP per capita but
rather reduce technical progress). If the R&D coefficient is taken to represent
growth effects, a 0.1 percentage point increase in R&D could boost output per
capita growth by some 0.3-0.4 per cent. These estimated effects are large, per-
haps unreasonably so, but nevertheless point to significant externalities in R&D
activities.
Policy and institutional influences on capital accumulation
To explore whether a given policy influences growth (or, in our interpretation,
the steady-state level of output) indirectly via its impact on the accumulation of
physical capital, investment-share regressions are shown in Table 6. The estimation
approach is similar to that of the growth regressions. Following experimentationThe Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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with three control variables – lagged output per capita, human capital and lagged
trade exposure – the preferred specification includes only a control for trade
exposure.
The variability of inflation has a negative coefficient but it is not significant at
the standard levels. Interestingly, the coefficient of the level of inflation is strongly
significant and negative in the investment equation, in contrast with the weaker
result in the growth regressions. These results are consistent with the view that
uncertainty about price developments mainly influences growth via distortions in
the allocation of resources (as discussed in the context of the growth equation),
rather than via discouraging the overall accumulation of physical capital, while
high levels of inflation indeed discourage saving and investment. There is also
evidence that the “size” of government may be negatively associated with the rate
of accumulation of private capital. This can be seen by looking at the coefficients
Table 6. Investment regressions1
(Pooled Mean Group Estimators)
1. All equations include short-run dynamics and country-specific terms, and control for outliers. Variables are defined
in Box 1. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
*: significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.




Infl–1 –0.02*** –0.03*** –0.02*** –0.03***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
LnSkgov
–1 –0.21*** –0.11** 0.02 –0.05
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)




Ln(Stock cap)–1 0.14*** 0.17***
(0.01) (0.02)
Ln(Priv credit)–1 0.09** 0.06
(0.03) (0.04)
Ln(Trade expadj)–1 –0.32*** –0.05 0.05 –0.31***
(0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Convergence coefficient
LnSk–1 –0.15*** –0.22*** –0.27*** –0.26***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
No. of countries 21 18 18 16
No. of observations 531 443 338 301
Log likelihood 936 776 693 601OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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on either taxes or government consumption (estimation with the latter allows the
use of a larger sample). Possible interactions between private and government
investment were also tested, but the results do not yield robust results of either a
negative or positive link.
The coefficients on financial variables in the investment regressions in
Table 6 have the expected signs and are (mostly) significant. As in the growth
regressions, the indicator of credit provided by the banking sector appears to be
only weakly associated with investment, while the stock market capitalisation has
a stronger bearing on investment.
SOME QUANTITATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS
The estimated coefficients of the different growth regressions can be used to
shed light on the role of policy and institutional settings for the growth experience
of different countries over the past two decades. Two important caveats need to
be borne in mind in this exercise. As discussed above, it is assumed that the pol-
icy and institutional variables affect only the level of economic efficiency and not
the steady-state growth rate. Moreover, the calculations should only be taken as
broad indications, given the variability of coefficients across the specifications,
and interaction effects that may be important but cannot be taken into account.
The estimated coefficients are used to perform three calculations: i) the effect of a
given change in a policy or institutional variable on steady-state output per capita;
ii) the decomposition of observed differences in average growth rate across coun-
tries over a 20-year period; and iii) the decomposition of observed changes in
growth rate within each country into its determinants. In the first calculation, the
direct effect of a policy change and the indirect effect (via investment) are consid-
ered, while in the other two calculations only the direct effect is estimated and
investment in physical capital is considered as one of the exogenous components
of the decomposition. Hence, in the last two calculations the overall contribution
of different policy levers to differences and changes in growth rates may well be
different if one takes into account their impact via the investment channel.
The long-run effect of policy and institutional changes
Bearing the above-mentioned caveats in mind, the total effects of policy and
institutional changes on GDP per capita can be summarised as follows (see
Table 7): 
• The point estimate for the variability of inflation suggests that a reduction
by 1 percentage point in the standard deviation in inflation – e.g. about one
and a half times the reduction recorded on average in the OECD countriesThe Driving Forces of Economic Growth: Panel Data Evidence for the OECD Countries
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from the 1980s to the 1990s – could lead to an increase in long-run output
per capita by 2 per cent, ceteris paribus.
• The effect of the level of inflation mainly works through investment: a
reduction of one percentage point – e.g. one-fourth of what was recorded in
the OECD between 1980s and 1990s – could lead to an increase in output
per capita of about 0.4-0.5 per cent, over and above what could also emerge
from any accompanying reduction in the variability of inflation.
• Taxes and government expenditures affect growth both directly and indi-
rectly through investment. An increase of about one percentage point in the
tax pressure – e.g. two-thirds of what was observed over the past decade in
the OECD sample – could be associated with a direct reduction of about
0.3 per cent in output per capita. If the investment effect is taken into
account, the overall reduction would be about 0.6-0.7 per cent.
Table 7. Estimated impact of changes in institutional or policy factors 
on GDP per capita1
1. The values reported in this table are the estimated long-run effects on output per working-age person of a given
policy change. The range reported reflects the values obtained in different specifications of the growth equation.
2. The direct effect refers to the impact on output per capita over and above any potential influence on the accumu-
lation of physical capital. The indirect effect refers to the combined impact of the variable on the investment rate
and by that channel, on output per capita.
3. Average change from the 1980 average to the 1990 average in the sample of 21 OECD countries, excluding new Mem-
bers as well as Iceland, Luxembourg and Turkey.
4. In percentage of GDP.
Variable
Impact on output per working age person
(per cent)2
Order of magnitude 
with respect to OECD 












(1% point fall in SD of 
inflation) 2.0 2.0
about 1.5 times
 the observed fall
Tax burden4
(increase of 1% point) –0.3 –-0.3 to –0.4 –0.6 to –0.7
about ⅔ of the 
observed increase
Business R&D intensity4




(increase of 10% points) 4.0 4.0
about the increase
 observedOECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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• Finally, an increase in trade exposure of 10 percentage points – about the
change observed over the past decade in the OECD sample – could lead to
an increase in steady-state output per capita of 4 per cent.
Explaining cross-country differences in average growth rates
Differences in growth rates across countries depends on two factors:
i) differences in the long-run equilibrium level of GDP per capita; and
ii) differences in the initial conditions (the actual level of GDP per capita at the
beginning of period considered). A country with the same initial level of GDP per
capita but better framework conditions – and thus a higher steady state level of
GDP – than another country will grow faster. This is due to the greater distance
from its own steady state. Similarly, a country with a lower initial level of GDP than
another country but the same steady state level will grow faster, again, because of
the wider gap to be closed. Moreover, within any period of time, the steady-state
level of GDP per capita could change because of changes in framework conditions,
and this third factor has also to be taken into account. Formally, for each country,
the decomposition of observed increases in GDP per capita over a time-period of
length t into a set of explanatory variables over the same period can be expressed
as follows:
where X = {lnsk, lnh, n, V} is the vector of independent variables (determinants of
the steady state),   is the vector of their long-run coefficients,  is the conver-
gence coefficient; –t indicates initial conditions and –m indicates that the variable
is lagged m periods.32 The first term on the right-hand side identifies the effect of
initial conditions on changes in GDP per capita, while the second accounts for the
determinants of the steady state. This decomposition can be used for two pur-
poses: i) to compare average growth rates across countries and assess the role of
initial conditions and differences in levels of determinants of the steady-state; and
ii) to track changes in GDP per capita growth rates within each country over sub-
periods and identify the impact of changes in the determinants of the steady state.
For example, the average level of human capital in Spain was below the OECD
average over the period 1970-98 and, thus, this contributed to a lower than aver-
age growth in GDP per capita (ceteris paribus). At the same time, however, human
capital has grown rapidly in Spain from the 1970s to the 1980s and 1990s, pushing
forward Spain’s steady state GDP per capita more than in most of the other coun-
tries: this has resulted in an acceleration in GDP per capita growth, again ceteris
paribus.
() [] () ∑∑ = − −
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The formula is derived from equation [2] above (omitting short-run dynamics
for the independent variables), that is:
Iterating equation (5) t-1 times yields:
Then, equation (4) can be derived by rearranging equation (6).
Table 8 shows the decomposition in relative terms (to the OECD simple aver-
age). To maximise the country coverage, we use the growth regression on the right-
hand-side of Table 3. This is run on 21 countries and uses government consump-
tion as a proxy for the effect of government “size” on growth. The results suggest
that the model fits the data rather well: there are only three countries where the
unexplained growth rate differential is large in absolute terms (last column of
Table 8).33 In two of these three countries (Greece and Portugal) the model
would have predicted a higher growth rate than that actually recorded. By con-
trast, the model under-predicts the average growth rate in the United States. In
these three countries, additional factors not accounted for in the present analy-
sis therefore played a significant role in shaping the growth process. The results
in Table 8 confirm some priors about the driving forces of output growth in the
OECD countries. In the English-speaking countries, a relatively low saving/
investment rate had a negative impact on growth, ceteris paribus. A relatively low
level of human capital compared with the OECD average over the period nega-
tively influenced growth in a number of European countries, but especially in
Portugal and Spain. In addition, some countries, including Australia, Canada,
Ireland and New Zealand, had a somewhat lower per capita growth as a result of
a rapidly growing population. Average macro policy conditions also had a bear-
ing in shaping cross-country differences in growth. Thus, the higher than average
variability of inflation had a negative impact in Greece and, to some extent in
Portugal, while the large “size” of government seems to have negatively influ-
enced growth in Denmark and Sweden. Finally, the relatively low exposure to
foreign trade (after controlling for the size of each country) seems to have had a
negative impact on growth in Australia and New Zealand, possibly reflecting
geographical location, while the reverse occurred in Belgium and Netherlands –
though the trade exposure for these two countries reflects, to some extent, the
large cross-border transactions amongst themselves – as well as in the United
Kingdom.
() ∑ + − = − j j jX y y 0 , 1 ln 1 ln θ φ φ (5)
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The role of policy and institutions in shaping the growth process over the past 
two decades
Policy and institutional settings have changed significantly over the past
decades and it is also important to examine the possible impact of these changes
on the growth path of each country (Figure 4). The improvement in human capital
has been one of the key factors behind the growth process of the past decades in
all OECD countries, but especially so in Germany, Italy, Greece, Netherlands
(mainly in the 1980s) and Spain, where the increase in human capital accounted
for more than half a percentage point acceleration in growth (in both the 1980s
and 1990s) with respect to the previous decade (even though the level of human
capital remained low compared to other countries). The contribution stemming
from changes in the investment rate is more mixed. Some countries are estimated
to have benefited from an increase in the investment rate in the past two decades
with respect to the 1970s (e.g. Japan, Canada, Austria, Belgium, New Zealand),
while others could have had a negative impact from lower investment rates
(e.g. Italy and Ireland in the 1980s, Finland in the 1990s).
There have also been important changes in policy and institutional settings in
each country that have contributed to growth, over and above the changes in fac-
tor inputs. Most countries have benefited, especially in the 1990s, from reduced
uncertainty due to a lower variability of inflation. The most noticeable examples
include the United Kingdom and Japan (in the 1980s) and Portugal and New
Zealand (in the 1990s) where about half a percentage point higher annual output
per capita growth rate is estimated to be due to the lower variability of inflation,
ceteris paribus. By contrast, in spite of public spending restraint, especially in the
last decade, the rise in the size of government contributed to slow down growth in
most countries. Notable exceptions include the United States, Ireland and the
Netherlands where a reduction in taxes and expenditures as a share of GDP some-
what boosted output per capita growth in the 1990s. Finally, but not least, the gen-
eralised process of trade liberalisation in which all OECD countries have been
involved is estimated to have increased growth by up to two-thirds of a percent-
age point annually over the past decade.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In broad terms, the estimated growth regressions explain much of the
observed growth paths across countries and over time. One striking result of our
study is the high speed with which countries seem to converge to their steady-
state growth path compared with previous estimates based on a larger set of
countries and cross-section data. This implies that observed cross-countryOECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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Figure 4. The estimated effect of changes in explanatory variables to changes 
in output per capita growth rates1








































Notes: The calculations are from decompositions of differences in growth rates based on the results of multivariate
regressions. The estimated impact of initial levels of GDP per capita and the component unexplained by the
regressions are not shown.
1. The changes in growth are based on differences in average growth in GDP per person of working age over each
decade.
2. Government consumption as a percentage of GDP is used as a proxy for the size of government due to data
availability. This variable is highly correlated in most countries with the tax and non-tax receipts (as a share of
GDP) for which, however country coverage is more limited.
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differences in GDP per capita levels may be largely the result of differences in
steady-state levels rather than different positions of countries along similar transi-
tional paths. In consequence, differences in investment rates and human capital
as well as in R&D, trade exposure, financial structures and macroeconomic condi-
tions and policy settings seem to play an important role for observed GDP per
capita patterns across countries. Changes in these factors can be rapidly trans-
lated into changes of living standards. The other main results of our study are as
follows:
• The estimated partial elasticity of output to physical capital is consistent
with the values implied in National Accounts data, even though it is on the
low side of the range. By contrast, and if taken at face value, the estimated
elasticity of output to human capital points to potential externalities in
investment in education, i.e. social returns seem higher than private returns
at least over the past decades, when education levels were relatively low.
• The evidence suggests that high inflation is negatively associated with the
accumulation of physical capital in the private sector and, through this
channel, has a negative bearing on output. Moreover, a high variability of
inflation affects GDP per capita, possibly because it leads to a shift in the
composition of investment towards less risky but also lower return projects.
• In addition, the empirical evidence lends some support to the notion that
the overall size of government in the economy may reach levels that hinder
growth. Although expenditure on health, education and research clearly
sustains living standards in the long term, and social transfers help to meet
social goals, all have to be financed. The results suggest that for a given
level of taxation, higher direct taxes lead to lower output per capita, while,
on the expenditure side, government consumption and government invest-
ment tend to have non negative effects on output per capita. Government
investment may also influence growth by improving the framework condi-
tions (e.g. better infrastructure) in which private agents operate.
• Research and development (R&D) activities undertaken by the business
sector seem to have high social returns, while no clear-cut relationship
could be established between non-business-oriented R&D activities and
growth. There are, however, possible interactions and international spill-
overs that the regression analysis cannot identify. Moreover, non-business
oriented R&D (e.g. energy, health and university research) may generate
basic knowledge with possible “technology spillovers” in the long run.
• The empirical evidence also confirms the importance of financial markets
for growth, both by helping to channel resources towards the most reward-
ing activities and in encouraging investment. In particular, the degree ofOECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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stock market capitalisation is found to be strongly related with both output
per capita (while controlling for investment) and with the investment rate.
All in all, the results suggest that differences in GDP per capita across the
OECD countries can be largely explained by different policy and institutional set-
tings and that countries can learn from each other on the optimal growth strategy.
Notwithstanding persistent differences in living standards, recent policy changes
seem to go in the right direction to enhance growth. Most countries have made
significant progress towards price stability and avoiding excessive macroeconomic
fluctuations. However, while there have been successful efforts to reduce public-
sector deficits, the overall tax pressure is still high in a number of them and has
risen in the past decade. On the structural side, most OECD countries have
recorded significant increases in their human capital, not least because of govern-
ment interventions. Even if it is possible that there are diminishing social returns
to any given increase in education levels, these developments have had (and will
have in the future) a positive impact on observed growth patterns. Furthermore,
the amount of resources devoted to R&D has generally increased from the 1980s
to the 1990s – though there has been some reduction in recent years largely due
to falls in defence-related government outlays. Moreover, more resources seem to
be channelled directly to the business sector with a greater role played by indus-
tries themselves. Beyond these considerations, there remain significant differ-
ences in growth rates across countries, possibly due to differences in other
framework conditions (e.g. regulation in the product and labour markets) which




1. It should also be stressed that evidence of convergence in GDP per capita amongst
OECD countries is largely concentrated in the post-war period: during most of the
19th century, most OECD countries were falling behind the United Kingdom and dur-
ing the first half of the 20th century most of them were falling behind the United
States. See Maddison (2001).
2. Indeed, new-growth models that incorporate a knowledge-producing sector can be
interpreted as incorporating the role that, for example, research universities may play
in the growth process. An early example of this type of model is in Uzawa (1965), later
examples include Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1998).
3. Amongst the several studies that suggest a negative association between uncertainty
on the one hand, and investment and growth, on the other, see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994
and Bertola and Caballero, 1994. Amongst the studies that have put into question the
negative association between uncertainty and investment are Abel (1983) and
Hartman (1972). They suggest that in an economy with no frictions, an increase in
uncertainty could even lead to higher investment rates.
4. In most OECD countries, government finances the bulk of expenditure on educational
institutions. See OECD (2001) for more details.
5. For example, Coe and Helpman (1995) find significant interaction between import pro-
pensities and the ability to benefit from foreign R&D: i.e. for a given level of R&D per-
formed abroad, countries with higher import propensity have higher productivity
growth. Moreover, small countries benefit more from R&D performed abroad than from
domestic R&D. Sachs and Warner (1995) claim trade openness as being an important
constraint to convergence for many of the world’s economies. Using aggregate data on
trade between (mainly) OECD countries, Ben-David and Kimhi (2000) find evidence to
support the idea that increasing trade between pairs of countries is associated with an
increased rate of convergence.
6. See e.g. Frankel and Romer (1999) and Baldwin (2000).
7. Where data for a large number of countries was available, growth regressions have typ-
ically taken averages over long time periods (e.g. 20 years). Other studies have taken
averages over five-year periods (see e.g. Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996). This choice,
however, implies a potential loss of information. Moreover, the lack of synchronisation
in country business cycles does not purge five-year averages from cyclical influences.
8. This is, for example, the case in one-sector models of endogenous growth in which
capital is not characterised by diminishing returns (see e.g. Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991).
9. This is the case in models of endogenous growth, which explicitly consider different
types of capital goods (e.g. physical and human), each characterised by its own accu-OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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mulation process (e.g. investment and education). See Uzawa (1965); Lucas (1988);
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
10. As discussed in detail by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), most cross-section stud-
ies of growth (e.g. Barro and Sala i Martin, 1995) estimate a regression of the general
form:
where ∆ lny is the growth rate of GDP per capita over a period of time (0 to T); lny0 is
the log of GDP per capita at time 0; and i identifies each country. They derive this
equation from a simple neo-classical growth model:
where lnyi,0
* is the log level of GDP per capita on the country’s steady-state path. How-
ever, it is not clear whether the policy and institutional variables in the first equation
are proxying for differences in country steady-state GDP per capita levels (lnyi,0
*)
(consistent with conditional convergence) or for cross-country differences in the long-
run growth rates gi.
11. Estimates of the speed of convergence to steady-state output vary in the literature:
while most studies estimated values around 2-3 per cent per year (Mankiw, et al., 1992;
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) – which implies that an economy spends about
20-30 years to cover half of the distance between its initial conditions and its steady
state – a few have found values of 10 per cent or more for the OECD countries
(e.g. Caselli et al., 1996), which imply less than nine years to cover half of the distance.
12. Under slope heterogeneity, estimates of a uniform convergence parameter are
affected by a downward heterogeneity bias (Pesaran and Smith, 1995).
13. In a theoretical growth model,   is a function of population growth (n I,t) and technolog-
ical progress (gi,t) and thus could vary across countries and over time. For the purpose
of the econometric analysis, time homogeneity had to be imposed, but the parame-
ters are allowed to vary across countries.
14. If the homogeneity assumption was not retained, the reported coefficient in the tables
is the simple average of country-specific coefficients.
15. This result may arise because for a number of OECD countries the average number of
years of schooling has increased steadily over the sample period. Our sensitivity anal-
ysis (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001) suggests that a time trend is only statistically sig-
nificant when human capital is omitted and is not statistically significant at standard
confidence levels when human capital is included. Consequently, in the retained
specification, human capital was included while the time trend was dropped.
16. The identification of outliers is based on the analysis of studentised residuals and leverage
values (see Belsley et al., 1980). The studentised residuals are obtained by considering a
mean-shift outlier model in which the basic equation is augmented by a dummy vari-
able that has the ith element equal to one and all other elements zero. The studen-
tised residual is the t-statistics of the dummy variable. The leverage point is identified
by the diagonal elements of the least-squared projection matrix, also called the hat
matrix. It proxies the distance between the ith observation and the centre of the data.
The outliers that have been removed from the sample are those with a studentised
residual greater than 2.5 and a leverage point above the cut-off value suggested by
Belsley et al. (1980). Eight outliers have been identified using dynamic fixed effect
T i i T i u y b y , 0 , , variables nal institutio and policy ln ln + + ⋅ − = ∆
() T i i i i T i y y g y , 0 ,
*
0 , , ln ln ln ε β + − ⋅ + = ∆
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estimators: the 1972-73 observations for New Zealand; 1995-97 for Ireland; 1972 for
Finland and 1972-73 for Portugal.
17. The country sample include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany (western), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
18. However, it should also be stressed that the evidence on the returns to education
reflects average rates of return based on historical data, whereas future marginal
returns may not be as high.
19. It should be stressed that these conclusions do not depend on a particular specifica-
tion of the growth equation: inclusion of a linear time trend, introduction of country-
specific time dummies, sample variations across countries and over time, all lead to
similar results (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001).
20. One of the reasons behind the difference in the present results on human capital has
to do with the quality of the data used in this paper compared with previous attempts.
We used a revised version of the Barro and Lee (1996) database as assembled by
de la Fuente and Doménech (2000) in combination with more recent OECD data
(see Appendix 2). Revisions were largely aimed at removing time and cross-country
inconsistencies in the original database. Using a similar proxy, de la Fuente and
Doménech (2000) also found a strongly significant coefficient for human capital in level
and growth equations.
21. The neo-classical model makes precise predictions on the value of the estimated
long-run parameters of the human and physical capital, as well as on population
growth. Furthermore, the speed of convergence [ ] can be expressed formally
as a function of the rate of technological progress, the rate of growth of the population,
the depreciation rate of physical and human capital as well as output elasticities to
human and physical capital, the latter being derived from the coefficients on sk and h
in equation [2] above. The estimated speed of convergence to the steady state path of
output per capita in our equations is too high with respect to what would be implied
by the estimated value of the elasticity of output with respect to “broad” (physical and
human) capital, which would imply very slow convergence (see Bassanini and Scar-
petta, 2001).
22. The uncertain result for the level of inflation is in line with Alexander (1997) who also
used an OECD sample. However, other papers that did not include the variability of
inflation in the growth equation found more solid links between the level of inflation
and growth, even in the OECD samples. See, for example, Andres and Hernando
(1997) and Englander and Gurney (1994).
23. The cross-country homogeneity restriction on the coefficient of the level of inflation is
rejected at the 5 per cent level in the model that does not include the trade exposure
variable and, once allowed to vary across countries, this coefficient becomes statisti-
cally insignificant.
24. The latter result is consistent with that of Folster and Henrekson (1998, 2000) who
focus on the link between the “size” of government and growth in OECD countries.
However the conclusions reached by Folster and Henrekson have been questioned by
some researchers, notably Agell et al. (1997).
25. See Helms (1985); Mofidi and Stone (1989); Kneller et al. (1998).
26. The cross-country correlation between the government consumption variable and the
tax and non-tax receipts variable is greater than 0.5 in each year of the sample and
) ˆ 1 log( φ − −OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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always greater than 0.6 after 1976. In time-series the correlation is greater than 0.9 in 9
out of 18 countries and greater than 0.7 in all but three countries (Belgium, the
Netherlands, and the United States).
27. The growth regression maintains its basic properties when estimated over the smaller
sample used in the R&D regressions. The coefficients on both physical and human
capital maintain their sign and statistical significance, although the convergence is
higher than in the regression estimated over the larger sample. This latter result is not
driven by the small country sample but rather by the shorter time period over which
the model is estimated.
28. In terms of previous evidence, Fagerberg (1994), for example, found a patent-based
index significant in growth regressions; and Englander and Gurney highlighted R&D
expenditure as a robust variable in their growth regressions.
29. Park (1995) also found private-sector R&D more important than public R&D in OECD-
based growth regressions.
30. Lichtenberg (1988) finds that non-competitive R&D procurement tends to crowd out
private R&D investment, while competitive procurement stimulates private R&D
investment. See David et al. (1999) for a survey. By contrast, Guellec and
Van Pottelsberghe (1997, 2001) support the complementarity hypothesis.
31. Given the short time period that can be used in this sample, lagging the R&D variable
would have induced an excessive loss of degrees of freedom.
32. Taking for simplicity the case of a hypothetical independent variable X that is constant
over time, equation [4] suggests that the weight of this variable is greater (in absolute
terms) the longer the time span over which the decomposition is performed. This
property generalises to time-varying independent variables. Hence, to be comparable
across countries and/or over time, growth decompositions undertaken according to
equation [4] have to refer to the same time span t.
33. A positive country-specific effect implies that actual growth was higher than predicted




THE POLICY-AND-INSTITUTIONS AUGMENTED GROWTH MODEL
The growth equation
Following a standard approach (see e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992; and Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1995), the standard neo-classical growth model is derived from a constant returns to scale
production function with two inputs (capital and labour) that are paid their marginal prod-
ucts. Production at time t is given by: 
where Y, K, H and L are respectively output, physical capital, human capital and labour, α  is
the partial elasticity of output with respect to physical capital, β  is the partial elasticity of out-
put with respect to human capital and A(t) is the level of technological and economic effi-
ciency. It can be assumed that the level of economic and technological efficiency At) has two
components: economic efficiency I(t) dependent on institutions and economic policy, and
the level of technological progress Ω (t) (see amongst others, Cellini et al., 1999 for a similar
formulation). In turn, I(t) can be written as, e.g. a log-linear function of institutional and policy
variables, while Ω (t) is assumed to grow at the rate g(t).
The time paths of the right-hand side variables are described by the following equations
(hereafter dotted variables represent derivatives with respect to time): 
where k = K/L, h = H/L, y = Y/L, stand for the capital labour ratio, average human capital and
output per worker respectively; sk and sh stand for the investment rate in physical and human
capital respectively; and d stands for the (constant) depreciation rate. Under the assumption
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that   <1  (i.e. decreasing returns to reproducible factors), this system of equations can
be solved to obtain steady-state values of k* and h* defined by:
Substituting these two equations into the production function and taking logs yields the
expression for the steady-state output in intensive form. The latter can be expressed either
as a function of sh (investment in human capital) and the other variables or as a function of h*
(the steady-state stock of human capital) and the other variables. Since in this paper human
capital is proxied by the average years of education of the working age population, a formu-
lation in terms of the stock of human capital was retained. The steady-state path of output in
intensive form can be written as:*
However, the steady-state stock of human capital is not observed. It can be shown that an
expression for h* as a function of actual human capital is: 
where ψ  is a function of ( ) and n + g+d .
Equation [A4] would be a valid specification in the empirical cross-country analysis only
if countries are in their steady states or if deviations from the steady state are independent
and identically distributed. If observed growth rates include out-of-steady-state dynamics,
then the transitional dynamics have to be modelled explicitly. A linear approximation of the
transitional dynamics can be expressed as follows (Mankiw et al., 1992): 
* Strictly speaking, equation (A4) is written under the simplifying assumption that policy and institu-
tional variables do not change persistently in the long-run. If this is not the case, ln (g+n+d ) must
be augmented by a term reflecting the rate of change of policy and institutional variables. As the
estimable equation is linearised and contains short-run dynamics anyway, this term will be omit-
ted hereafter for simplicity.
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where  . Adding short-term dynamics to equation (A6) yields:
Equation (A7) represents the generic functional form that has been empirically esti-
mated in this paper. Estimates of steady state coefficients as well as of the parameters of the
production function can be retrieved on the basis of the estimated coefficients of this equa-
tion by comparing it with equation (A6). For instance, an estimate of the elasticity of steady
state output to the investment rate (that is the long-run effect of the investment rate on out-
put) is given by  , where ^ identifies estimated coefficients. Conversely, an estimate of
the share of physical capital in output (the parameter α  of the production function) can be
obtained as  .
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The data used in this paper are from the following sources:
• Data on GDP, working-age population, gross fixed capital formation, general govern-
ment current nominal tax and non-tax receipts, direct and indirect taxes, government
nominal final consumption and imports and exports are from the OECD Analytical Data
Base (ADB). Purchasing Power Parity benchmarks for 1993 are from the OECD Statistics
Department. In the case of Norway, data refer to the mainland economy. In the case of
Greece and Portugal the ratio between total gross fixed capital formation and total real
GDP was used as a proxy for the investment rate (i.e. the ratio of private non-residential
fixed capital formation to business sector real GDP), due to data availability.
• Data on Research and Development (R&D) are from the OECD Main Science and Technol-
ogy Indicators (MSTI) database. A few missing observations were obtained by interpola-
tion.
• Data on human capital are calculated on the basis of raw data on education attain-
ment. In particular: three educational groups were considered: below upper second-
ary education (ISCED 0 to ISCED 2); upper secondary education (ISCED 3); and
tertiary education (ISCED 5 to ISCED 7). Data on education attainment up to the
early 1980s are interpolated from five-year observations from De la Fuente and
Doménech (2000), while later observations are from matched OECD sources (Educa-
tion at a Glance, various issues). The cumulative years of schooling by educational
level – required to estimate the average number of years of total schooling used in the
empirical analysis – are from the OECD Education at a Glance – 1997 (OECD, 1998).
• The indicators measuring financial market developments are from the World Bank’s
financial development database (see Beck et al., 1999). For more details on the pros
and cons of these two indicators and for the motivation of their inclusion, see Leahy
et al. (2001).
The definition of each variable is provided in Box 1 of the main text. The exact country
coverage of the variables is presented in Table A2.1, while the basic statistics are in
Table A2.2.
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Table A2.1. Details on data availability
Variable Start date End date Exceptions
Real GDP per person of working 
age (Y)
1971 1998 1971-1997 for Portugal and Spain; 1971-1996 
for Greece; 1971-1994 for Western Germany.
Accumulation of physical capital (Sk)
1971 1998 1971-1997 for Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; 
1971-1996 for the United Kingdom; 
1971-1995 for Switzerland; 1971-1990 for 
Western Germany; 1975-1998 for Australia.
Human capital (H)
1971 1998 1971-1990 for Western Germany and Japan
Growth of working age population 
(∆ LnP) 1971 1998 1971-1997 for Spain; 1971-1996 for Greece; 
1971-1994 for Western Germany.
Standard deviation of inflation 
(Sdinfl–1)
1971 1998
Inflation (Infl–1) 1971 1998
Government consumption (Govcons
–1) 1971 1998
Accumulation of physical capital by 
government (Skgov
–1) 1971 1998 1971-1997 for Switzerland; 1971-1996 for 
Portugal; 1971-1995 for Western Germany.
Tax and non-tax receipts as a share 
of GDP (Tax–1) 1971 1998 1971-1997 for Portugal; 1971-1995 for 
Western Germany; 1978-1998 for Ireland; 
1987-1998 for New Zealand; 1988-1998 for 
the United Kingdom; no data for Switzerland.
Ratio of direct/indirect taxes 
(Tax distr –1) 1971 1998 1971-1998 for Switzerland; 1971-1996 for 
Portugal; 1971-1995 for Western Germany; 
1978-1998 for Ireland; 1987-1998 for New 
Zealand; 1988-1998 for the United Kingdom.
Total R&D expenditure as a share 
of GDP (R&Dtot) 1981 1998 1981-1997 for Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom; 1981-1996 for Australia and 
Switzerland; 1982-1997 for Portugal; 
1983-1995 for Belgium; 1989-1997 for New 
Zealand; no data for mainland Norway.
Business-performed R&D 
expenditure as a share of GDP 
(BERD)
1981 1998 1981-1997 for Australia, Greece, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom; 1981-1996 for Switzerland; 
1981-1995 for Belgium; 1981-1993 for 
Austria; 1982-1997 for Portugal; 
1989-1997 for New Zealand; no data for 
mainland Norway.
Non-business performed R&D 
expenditure as a share of GDP 
(R&Dpub)
1981 1998 1981-1997 for Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom; 1981-1996 for Australia and 
Switzerland; 1981-1993 for Austria; 
1982-1997 for Portugal; 1983-1995 for 
Belgium; 1989-1997 for New Zealand; no 
data for mainland Norway.OECD Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II
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Table A2.1. Details on data availability (cont.)
Variable Start date End date Exceptions
Private credit as a share of GDP 
(Priv credit–1)
1971 1998 1971-1997 for Ireland and Portugal; 
1971-1992 for Western Germany.
Stock market capitalisation as a share 
of GDP (Stock cap–1)
1977 1998 1977-1997 for Belgium and Switzerland; 
1977-1991 for Western Germany; 
1979-1995 for Portugal; 
1982-1998 for Norway; 
1984-1998 for Finland; 
1986-1998 for New Zealand; 
1996-1998 for Ireland.
Trade exposure (Trade exp–1) 1971 1998
Table A2.2. Basic Statistics
1. In 1995 US$ (Expressed in 1993 EKS PPPS).
2. Average years of education.
Variables (in per cent) Sample mean 
(absolute values or per cent) Standard deviation
Y (1993 PPP $)1 23 951.0 5 783.0
Sk (%) 17.11 4.46
H (years)2 10.15 1.69
∆ LnP (%) 0.79 0.62
Sdinfl–1 1.51 1.27
Infl–1 (%) 6.87 4.89
Gov cons–1 (%)  18.46 5.11
Skgov
–1 (%) 3.70 2.06
Tax–1 (%) 39.62 9.19
Tax distr–1 (%) 11 2.44 43.44
R&Dtot (%) 1.72 0.80
BERD (%) 1.05 0.64
R&Dpub (%) 0.66 0.21
Priv credit–1 (%) 56.98 29.50
Stock cap–1 (%) 33.79 28.86
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